Top Five Asinine Aviation Security Rules

Of the voluminous and every-growing corpus of aviation security rules, there are many, such as the shoe rule and the liquid rule, that have arguable effectiveness. I don't know enough from a scientific and behavioral perspective to say whether or not these procedures are worthwhile. Instead, this list is dedicated to the truly asinine rules -- ones which either defeat their own purpose altogether or are completely devoid of common sense.

1. Secondary Security Screening Selection
Certain passengers are selected by their airline for additional security screening, which includes a full-body wanding, a patdown, and a manual search of their carry-on. Passengers are selected either because of some risk factor (cash payment, last-minute booking) or at random. The problem is that selectees find the notation "SSSS" on their boarding pass and hence know that they'll be getting the treatment long before they approach the checkpoint. If you were a terrorist seeking to sneak some contraband liquid onto the plane, you'd take one look at your boarding pass and leave the airport in order to try your jihad another day.

2. The No-Fly List
According to documents obtained by CBS' 60 Minutes, there are some 44,000 names on the no-fly list. Passengers with a name match cannot check in online or via a self-service kiosk. Instead, they must approach the counter and wait for the airline rep to call a law enforcement officer who will determine whether the passenger is indeed a security threat. Many men named Robert Johnson are on the list, since Robert Johnson is the alias of a Trinidadian citizen convicted of a terrorist plot in Canada. It is no huge leap of faith for an airline agent to decide that the 25-year-old white man in front of them is not the 62-year-old black terrorist named Robert Johnson, who the United States would never let into this country anyway. Of course, the no-fly list assumes that terrorists will fly under their own name or a known alias.

3. Trusted Traveler
The original idea of this program was that frequent fliers could submit to a background check and become a trusted traveler in exchange for an abbreviated security procedure and a guarantee of avoiding random secondary checks. But the alarmists cried out that someone could turn terrorist after the background check and circumvent the screening because the government trusted them. So, under the current procedure, you pay $99.95 per year and undergo an iris scan for the privilege of going to the front of the line and undergoing the same exact security check to which everyone else must submit. So, your trusted traveler card is nothing more than a line pass. I assume most of these frequent fliers have status on their airline of choice, which would allow them to cut into the front of the line at many airports anyway. So, if the TSA's contractor is selling line passes, what's the point of the background check and iris scan?

4. One Bag Rule
In the wake of the liquids scare, the British Airports Authority instituted a rule limiting passengers to one bag, personal items (i.e. briefcases and purses) included. The number of bags a passenger has is irrelevant for security purposes, since they'd all need to be screened, whether checked or carried onboard. Therefore, this "security" rule is merely a crowd-control measure that enables the infamously stingy BAA to avoid hiring more screeners. But, if passengers are limited to one bag, they are more likely to shove as much stuff as possible in that bag. The more stuff is in a bag, the harder it is for screeners to detect any contraband with the x-ray (which is why laptops, with their dense circuitry, must be screened separately). By limiting their passengers to a single bag, the BAA is actually making it harder for their screeners to do their job.

5. Shoe Screening at Heathrow
On a recent trip, I witnessed the following bit of inanity: After clearing the notorious security lines at Heathrow, passengers pass by one of two passport control desks manned by immigration officers. Then, passengers from one of those desks go through an additional security checkpoint where their shoes and liquid baggies are x-rays. The passengers from the other desk bypass that checkpoint entirely and can proceed into the waiting area. There are two major problems with this setup. First off, passengers can stash some C-4 explosive in their shoe while going through the first checkpoint, then deftly transfer it to their carry-on luggage before going through the second checkpoint. But more importantly, if you have something to hide in your shoe, you will look past the passport control desks and figure out which one will let you avoid the subsequent check.